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Solidarity Enters the Fray
By David S. Mason
HE recent agreements be
tween the Polish government
and the Solidarity-led opposi
tion are path-breaking developments.
They herald the dawning of democra
cy and could portend the eventual
disintegration of the Soviet bloc. But
those goals are still distant.
The first step may be the most diffi
cult: holding open and competitive
national legislative elections. For Soli
darity, the elections pose an exciting
opportunity to share in the govern
ance of Poland, but they also confront
the opposition with formidable chal
lenges. The outcome ofthe elections is
by no means certain.
The April agreements included
provisions on social policy, economic
reform, and trade union pluralism
(which legalizes Solidarity). Most im
portant are the political reforms. The
agreement calls for "radical reform of
the state" and for "political pluralism,"
including the right to freely form po
litical and social organizations. It also
recognizes the right of a political op
position to legal activity.
An institutionalized role for the op
position is provided in a restructured
national legislature. The existing par
liament, the Sejm, will be elected in
June with 35 percent of the seats re
served for "nonparty" candidates; that
is, for people not belonging to the rul
ing communist party or its coalition
partners. A second legislative cham
ber, the Senate, will be reconstituted,
with freely contested elections for all
I 00 seats. Candidates can be regis
tered by collecting signatures from
3,000 eligible voters in their districts.
The new Senate will have the right to
veto legislation passed by the Sejm.
These arrangements make it possi
ble for Solidarity to control one cham
ber of the legislature and therefore to
exercise a major voice in Poland's fu
ture. But first Solidarity must win the
elections - a task which, in spite of
widespread popular disgust with the
regime, may not be so easy. Seven
years of political and economic stagna
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tion have turned most Poles away
from politics altogether.
Until the last few months, public
opinion polls, both official and unoffi
cial, have shown low levels of support
for both the regime and the opposition.
Lech Walesa's and Solidarity's popu
larity skyrocketed to 79 percent and
70 percent, respectively, during the
round-table discussions, but it remains
to be seen whether this level of sup
port will continue. Compared with
past years, even under martial law,
there are few signs of support for the
opposition in the streets of Warsaw.
A related problem is the divisions
within the opposition.
Mr. Walesa has created a Citizens'
Committee of about I 00 prominent
opposition figures, which will take re
sponsibility for managing the cam
paign for the opposition. But this
committee contains representatives of
different constituencies: the "old"
leadership of Solidarity from 1980-81 ;
some of the more militant leaders of
the strikes in 1988; representatives of
other
underground
opposition
groups, such as "Freedom and Peace";
academics; farmers; and the Roman
Catholic intelligentsia.
Walesa faces a major task in hold
ing together these various constituen
cies, at least until the elections. He ex
pressed concern himself about this
phenomenon on his recent visit to
Rome: "Solidarity for the moment is
huge, but it will become smaller with
the growth of other organizations.
This is the logical course of events."
Given the relatively easy procedure
for registering candidates, it is likely
that there will be more than two candi
dates for some of the "opposition"
seats. This raises the possibility that a
splintered opposition will divide its
votes and allow the regime's candi
dates to win.
This eventuality is diminished
somewhat by the two-step electoral
procedure provided for in the agree
ments. A candidate must win 50 per
cent of the votes in the first round;
otherwise the top two candidates face
a runoff election in the second round.
This is similar to the French electoral
system: a compromise between the

American "winner-take-all" system
and the other extreme of proportional
representation. It is not likely to help
the regime's candidates win; on the
other hand, it could lead to a
multiplicity of groups (or even per
haps parties) on the opposition side.
Thus, the divisions in Polish society
will be reflected in the legislature it
self This will require bargaining and
compromises within the opposition, as
well as between the opposition and the
regime. The word "compromise" has
almost entirely negative connotations
for most Poles; this is one reason so
many were skeptical about the round
table negotiations and agreements.
For good or ill, however, compromise
will be necessary for the new legisla
tive arrangements to work.
OLIDARITY faces another
challenge - from those who
support the regime, or oppose
Solidarity. The Western myth holds
that everyone supports Solidarity. But
that was not true even at the end of
1981, when the bitter political battles,
strikes, and economic collapse cut
away at its popularity. Polls in the mid
I 980s showed about a third of the
population supported the opposition,
a third supported the regime, and the
rest constituted a Polish silent "major
ity." The regime can expect support
from its third, and will campaign for
support from the silent third. There
are many sentiments the party can
tap: support for egalitarianism; for
"law and order"; for evolutionary
change.
The agreements are cast as "the be
ginning of the road to parliamentary
democracy." But such a system is not
easy to achieve; only about 20 coun
tries worldwide have maintained such
a system over a sustained period. Sol
idarity and the Polish opposition will
learn quickly how difficult the path
will be. They may not "win" this June.
But the contest is the beginning of the
end of traditional communism.
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